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Tuition reimbursement programs provide financial assistance for direct costs of education and 
are a type of general skills training program commonly offered by employers in the United 
States. Standard human capital theory argues that investment in firm-specific skills reduces 
turnover, while investment in general skills training could result in increased turnover. However, 
firms cite increased retention as a motivation for offering tuition reimbursement programs. This 
rationale for offering these programs challenges the predictions of the standard human capital 
model. This paper tests empirically whether tuition reimbursement programs increase employee 
retention. The empirical analysis combines two data sources: a case study of a non-profit 
institution and the Survey of Employer-Provided Training, 1995 (SEPT95), which consists of 
training data collected from a cross section of establishments.  From the case study analysis, this 
paper finds that participation in tuition reimbursement increases retention. Results from SEPT95 
confirm this finding. These results are consistent with a theory in which investment in general 
human capital is used to complement investments in firm-specific human capital. 
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1.0  Introduction 
 
Becker’s (1964) seminal work on investment in human capital makes a fundamental 
distinction between general and firm-specific skills, which has implications for investment and 
employee turnover. Firm-specific human capital is defined as having value only to the current 
employment relationship, while general human capital is valuable to both current and potential 
employers. Becker’s theory predicts that employees will bear the full cost of general skills 
training – either by paying for training directly or by accepting lower wages during training 
periods – because employers face the threat of not capturing the return on their investment due to 
“poaching” of trained employees by other employers. In a competitive labor market, workers 
have the incentive to invest efficiently in general human capital because they receive a wage 
equal to the value of their marginal product.  In the case of investment in firm-specific human 
capital, employers and employees share the costs. Neither party is willing to bear the full amount 
due to the risk of opportunistic behavior by the other.  The employer and the employee share the 
surplus, or rents, from the investment; the relative bargaining power of the two parties 
determines how these rents are allocated.  
This standard theory on investment in human capital has implications for turnover. 
Investment in firm-specific human capital reduces turnover because rents accrue only if the 
employment relationship is maintained. However, this result does not hold for investments in 
general human capital because these skills are transferable across employers. According to 
Becker’s theory, offering employees general skills training would increase turnover. 
Despite the predictions of this theory, recent empirical studies show that firms provide 
general training to their workers and argue that firms bear part of the cost.
2 Tuition 
reimbursement programs are an example of general skills training provided by firms.  Employers 
reimburse employees for direct costs of coursework taken at accredited academic institutions. 
Because instruction and degree accreditation occur at third-party institutions, skills acquired are 
transferable – as well as observable – to many potential employers. Hence, tuition 
reimbursement programs closely resemble general skills training as described by Becker.  
                                                 
2 These include, but are not limited to Loewenstein and Spletzer (1999a, 1999b), Acemoglu and Pischke (1998, 
1999), Autor (1998), and Cappelli (2004).    3 
A primary reason firms give for offering these programs is to reduce turnover, which 
challenges standard human capital theory.
3  This paper examines empirically whether tuition 
reimbursement programs increase employee retention. The analysis uses two data sources to test 
the effect of tuition reimbursement programs on turnover: 1) a case study analysis of workers at a 
non-profit institution that offers a tuition reimbursement program; and 2) a cross section of 
establishment-level data collected in the Survey of Employer-Provided Training, 1995 
(SEPT95). Taking these two perspectives – that of the employee and that of the establishment – 
ensures a more complete depiction of the effect. 
Results from both the case study and SEPT95 indicate that tuition reimbursement 
programs reduce turnover.  Hence, the firm’s motivation for offering this program is supported 
by empirical evidence: general skills training increases retention. The prediction of standard 
human capital theory that investment in general human capital increases turnover is incorrect.  
However, the empirical findings of this paper can be interpreted within standard theory by 
allowing firm-specific and general human capital to interact, such as through complementarities 
between these two types of skills.    
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the prevalence of 
tuition reimbursement programs and their typical characteristics. Section 3 reviews previous 
studies of these training programs. The case study is presented in Section 4, while Section 5 
presents the analysis using SEPT95. To facilitate interpretation of the results within Becker’s 
theory of investment in human capital, Section 6 outlines one possible mechanism for how 
general training could increase employee retention. Conclusions and areas for future research are 
given in Section 7. 
 
2.0  Background on Tuition Reimbursement Programs  
 
2.1  Program Prevalence 
 
Employer-sponsored tuition reimbursement programs are widespread and constitute a 
nontrivial part of non-wage compensation. The amount spent on these programs is substantial: 
                                                 
3 Increased retention is a response given by human resource professionals in interviews with the author. Cappelli 
(2004) and Corporate Leadership Council (2002) report the same finding.   4 
Workforce Management estimates that companies paid $10 billion toward tuition 
reimbursements in 2003.
4  Using SEPT95, firms employing 50 or more workers spent $2.8 
billion in 1994 on tuition reimbursement.
5  Hence, expenditures on tuition reimbursement 
programs are increasing and represent a significant source of investment in general skills of 
employees. 
A substantial fraction of firms offer tuition reimbursement. Using the 1994 National 
Employer Survey of Educational Quality in the Workforce (NES-EQW), Lynch and Black 
(1998) report that 47 percent of firms employing 20 or more employees offer tuition 
reimbursement programs. Results from SEPT95 show that 61 percent of establishments 
employing 50 or more workers offer tuition reimbursement programs. The estimates from 
SEPT95 and 1994 NES-EQW are comparable because the probability of offering a tuition 
program increases with firm size (see Section 5.1).  
The tax-advantaged status of reimbursements from employer-provided programs has 
probably contributed to their prevalence.  The tax exclusion for employer-provided tuition 
programs from personal income and payroll tax was passed into law as a part of the Revenue Act 
of 1978 (P.L. 95-600) and codified in Section 127 of the U.S. Internal Revenue Code.
6 The 
maximum income exclusion for a single calendar year is $5,250, and reimbursements under this 
level are exempt from federal income tax, payroll tax, and state income tax. The U.S. Federal 
Government estimates the tax exclusion will cost $3.2 billion in lost federal tax revenues from 
2006 to 2010.
7 Tuition reimbursement is interesting to study from a labor economics perspective 
because it is a prevalent training program that clearly meets Becker’s definition of investment in 
general skills; the tax-advantaged status of these programs makes them relevant to public policy 
as well. 
 
                                                 
4 Workforce Management, May 1, 2004. Copyright 2004 Crain Communications Inc. 
5 The confidence interval for this estimate is $2.6 to $3.0 billion 
6 Section 127 of the Internal Revenue Code outlines the tax-advantaged status of educational assistance plans 
provided by employers: “Gross income of an employee does not include amounts paid or expenses incurred by the 
employer for educational assistance to the employee if the assistance is furnished pursuant to a [educational 
assistance] program” (26 U.S.C.§ 127). 
7 Office of Management and Budget, Fiscal Year 2006.   5 
2.2  Program Characteristics 
 
Tuition reimbursement programs typically consist of three parts: 1) a maximum 
reimbursement amount; 2) an eligibility requirement; and 3) a reimbursement policy based on 
academic performance. A 2002 survey by Eduventures of human resource professionals and 
managers at over 500 firms finds that 70 percent of firms offering a tuition reimbursement 
program cap annual reimbursement, and over half of these firms (57 percent) have maximums 
that exceed $4,000 (Eduventures 2003).
8  Table 1 shows the distribution of reimbursement 
maximums from the Eduventures survey.  The majority of firms choose maximums below or 
equal to the maximum annual tax exclusion, $5,250, but a significant fraction of firms have 
reimbursement maximums that exceed the tax exempt limit or have no maximum reimbursement 
amount. Among firms offering tuition benefits, nearly 40 percent offer reimbursements beyond 
the level that receives tax-advantaged status (i.e. amounts greater than $5,250).  
Most firms in the Eduventures survey allow employees to become eligible for the 
program after six months of service; rarely do eligibility requirements exceed one year.  Twenty 
percent of firms impose service requirements after participation. Service requirements after 
participation are more common in plans that have unlimited tuition reimbursement. The 2002 
survey by Eduventures also reports that over 90 percent of programs have a minimum grade 
standard for reimbursement, typically set at a “C” or better. Many companies tie grades directly 
to reimbursement percentages, making the cost of participation higher for workers who receive 
lower grades.  The tuition reimbursement program analyzed in the case study has an eligibility 
requirement of one year of service and does not have a service requirement after participation. 
The maximum reimbursement amount is $5,250 for a single year and the program only 
reimburses costs of tuition for participants obtaining a “C” grade or better.  Hence, the case study 
program is typical in its reimbursement amount and requirements, making it a good candidate for 
case study analysis. 
In addition to the above characteristics, the firm must follow guidelines set by the 
Internal Revenue Code for tuition reimbursements to be exempt from taxation. To qualify for the 
                                                 
8 The survey was sponsored by Cenquest, a provider of managed education solutions, which helps companies create 
and manage tuition assistance programs (www.cenquest.com). Eduventures, who conducted the survey,  is an 
independent research and advisory firm of corporate, post-secondary, and pre-K-12 learning markets 
(www.eduventures.com).   6 
tax exclusion, a firm must have a written plan for the exclusive benefit of providing employees 
with educational assistance.  The program must meet non-discrimination clauses and employees 
cannot be offered a choice between educational assistance and other forms of compensation. 
Before 1978, all employer-provided educational expenses fell under Section 162 of the U.S. 
Internal Revenue Code.  Section 162, enacted in 1954, excludes employer-provided educational 
assistance from taxation as long as the coursework is job-related. Over time, the “job-related” 
requirement became narrowly interpreted due to court case rulings, thus limiting the educational 
opportunities of employees in low-level positions relative to employees in higher-level positions 
who typically have broad job descriptions. The legislative intent of the tax exclusion in Section 
127 was to provide educational opportunities at the workplace for lower-level employees – those 
employees who could not take advantage of educational assistance for job-related coursework 
because they were limited by narrow job descriptions.  
The tax exclusion affects program characteristics by requiring firms to establish a 
separate plan offered to all regular employees. The program also needs to satisfy non-
discrimination clauses, meaning that firms cannot restrict the use of this program to highly 
compensated employee. In addition, the maximum reimbursement exempt from taxation 
provides a focal point for reimbursement levels offered by firms. Hence, even though 
establishment-level information on program characteristics is not available in SEPT95, the 
requirements stipulated in the tax code imply that tuition reimbursement programs are similar 
across firms. 
 
3.0    Literature on Tuition Reimbursement Programs 
 
  Despite the prevalence of tuition reimbursement programs, few academic studies have 
looked explicitly at these programs. The primary reasons given by firms as to why they offer 
tuition reimbursement programs are: recruitment and employee retention.  The first reason 
implies that tuition reimbursement programs are a non-wage benefit. The rationale for the second 
reason is that tuition reimbursement programs are training programs that affect worker 
productivity, and thus retention. 
   7 
3.1  Tuition Reimbursement and Recruitment  
 
   The use of benefits as a recruiting device is prevalent in labor and personnel economics. 
Rosen’s (1986) work on “equalizing differences” established a theory for how non-wage benefits 
affect the composition of workers attracted to a firm. In the case of a tuition reimbursement, 
workers who value continuing education are willing to trade-off wages (at some rate) for tuition 
payments. This tradeoff implies that the incidence of tuition reimbursement is on the worker. The 
tax-advantaged status increases the value of a given level of tuition benefits; the value increases 
with the worker’s marginal tax rate.  
  A common reaction to these programs is to only attribute their provision by firms to their 
tax-advantaged status. However, this overlooks the trade-off between wage and non-wage 
compensation. If total compensation reflects the value of a worker’s marginal product, then 
benefits and wages are substitutes at the margin. Firms offer tuition reimbursement program 
instead of additional wages or other benefits if tuition benefits are more effective at attracting a 
certain type of workers.  The tax-advantaged status of tuition reimbursement programs increases 
the value of these benefits to a worker facing a positive tax rate, but cannot explain why a firm 
offers tuition benefits instead of other forms of compensation. 
  Cappelli (2004) addresses the effect of tuition reimbursement programs on recruitment by 
developing a model in which provision of these programs generates a separating equilibrium in 
which only high-ability workers choose to work at firms with a tuition program. His model 
includes two types of agents – low and high ability – in which ability is known to the worker, but 
unknown to the firm. Participation in a tuition reimbursement program is assumed to reveal the 
worker’s type to all potential employers because instruction takes place outside the firm. Because 
participation is assumed to be more costly to workers with low ability, wages can be set such that 
all high-ability types participate and no low-ability types participate. Hence, in his model, firms 
use tuition reimbursement programs as a screening device to attract high-ability workers. Using 
educational attainment as a proxy for ability, Cappelli tests his theory using the 1997 National 
Employer Survey (NES-EQW) and finds that the average education attainment of new hires is 
higher for firms with tuition reimbursement programs, which is consistent with his theory if 
educational attainment is a direct measure of ability.   8 
However, the sharp prediction of his model – all high ability types participate – is 
inconsistent with empirical participation rates. Participation in tuition reimbursement programs 
by employees is low, typically between three and five percent.
9  The Corporate Leadership 
Council (2002) reports that low participation rates could be due to a lack of marketing by firms.  
If employees lack information about the program, it cannot influence an employee’s selection of 
employer.  Cappelli (2004) controls for recruiting costs when he obtains his result that the 
education level of new hires is higher in firms that offer tuition reimbursement programs, but his 
estimation does not control for benefits and wages. This omission could confound his result 
because high wage, high benefit firms are more likely to offer tuition programs (see Section 5.1) 
and these firms are also more likely to employ workers with higher educational attainment. 
Additionally, his model does not address why some firms offer tuition reimbursement and others 
do not.  Due to the limitations of the data used in this analysis, 1997 NES-EQW, Cappelli does 
not examine determinants of offering a tuition reimbursement program. In the 1997 NES-EQW, 
85 percent of firms respond affirmatively to the question pertaining to the provision of tuition 
reimbursement programs. A change in the wording of the question in the NEW-EQW between 
1994 and 1997 resulted in the reported incidence of tuition programs increasing from 47 percent 
in 1994 to 85 percent in 1997. This paper is the first to examine the determinants of offering 
tuition reimbursement programs.  
Aside from the sharp predictions and shortcomings listed above, the general idea of 
Cappelli’s (2004) model is attractive because it is consistent with Rosen’s (1986) prior work. 
The low participation rates found empirically could be reconciled in his model by thinking of 
workers as attaching an option value to participation: non-participants at firms that offer the 
program could be systematically different (i.e. of higher ability) than workers at firms that do not 
offer this program if high ability workers are willing to trade-off wages for the option of 
participating.
10 Data on how implementation of a tuition reimbursement program affects the 
applicant pool would be ideal to test the effect of these program on recruitment. However, this 
type of data is difficult to obtain. Results from the case study in Section 4 provide inconclusive 
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conversations with HR personnel at firms with a program.  
10 Low participation rates could be explained by adding a exogenous shock that decreases the cost of participation, 
or by modeling heterogeneity in ability as a continuous distribution.   9 
evidence that implementation of a tuition reimbursement program differentially affects new hires 
and existing employees in terms of the impact of participation on employee retention. 
   
3.2  Tuition Reimbursement and Retention 
 
  In contrast to using tuition benefits as a recruiting device, the claim by firms that they use 
tuition reimbursement programs to reduce turnover does not have support in the theoretical 
literature. Rather, the theoretical literature predicts the opposite: provision of general skills 
training would increase turnover.  Becker’s (1964) theory of investment in human capital argues 
that, because general skills are fully transferable (by definition) firms risk having their trained 
employees poached or “cherry-picked” by outside firms if they provide workers with general 
skills training. The labor market is assumed to be competitive, resulting in the worker’s wage set 
equal to the value of her marginal product. Because the worker captures the full return on the 
investment, Becker’s theory implies that the worker bears the full cost of general training. 
Because the market is competitive and skills are transferable, the worker is indifferent between 
employers. Therefore, even if the incidence of general skills training falls on the worker, 
turnover would be non-decreasing in the provision of general skills training. This disconnect 
between the theoretical literature and the intended use of these programs by firms presents an 
opportunity to analyze empirically the effect of tuition reimbursement programs on retention.   
  There are several case studies that examine the tuition reimbursement programs offered 
by the U.S. Department of Defense.
11 The two studies most similar in their econometric 
methodology to the case study analysis in this paper are Garcia, Arkes, and Trost (2000) and 
Buddin and Kapur (2005), which examine the impact of tuition reimbursement on retention in 
the U.S. Navy. Garcia, Arkes, and Trost (2000) follow a cohort of enlistees who began service in 
1992 and study the effect of participation on the likelihood of remaining with the Navy for at 
least six years. They find that participation increases the probability of staying in the Navy by 
nearly 13 percentage points.  
  Buddin and Kapur (2005) find the opposite: participation in tuition reimbursement 
decreases the probability of re-enlisting after four years by 16.5 percent. Buddin and Kapur 
                                                 
11 These include Boesel and Johnson (1988), Garcia and Joy (1998), Garcia, Arkes, and Trost (2000), and Buddin 
and Kapur (2002, 2005).   10 
criticize Garcia, Arkes, and Trost’s (2000) definition of retention and instead use re-enlistment 
after the end of a four-year contract as the relevant measure. Buddin and Kapur (2005) argue that 
the time window for which enlistees have access to participation in tuition reimbursement should 
be held fixed, and so they limit their sample only to those enlistees who served a full four-year 
contract. These two studies also differ in the variables used as exclusion restrictions in their 
bivariate probit estimation: Garcia, Arkes, and Trost (2000) use participation in the orientation 
session for educational opportunities offered to enlistees, while Buddin and Kapur (2005) use the 
enlistee’s proximity to a four-year college before enlistment and an interaction between the 
number of courses offered on base and the size of the base.  Buddin and Kapur argue that the 
instrument used by Garcia, Arkes, and Trost (2000) fails the exogeneity test.
12  
  While the exclusion restriction in Garcia, Arkes, and Trost (2000) is untenable, this paper 
does not agree with Buddin and Kapur’s (2005) criticism that the window of opportunity for 
participation needs to be held constant for “leavers” and “stayers”. If enlistees jointly determine 
their participation and retention decisions, constraining the duration of service to be the same 
across participants and non-participants imposes restrictions on the effect of the program. By 
using different criteria for their samples, Garcia, Arkes, and Trost (2000) and Buddin and Kapur 
(2005) are addressing slightly different research questions. Garcia, Arkes, and Trost (2000) 
examine the effect of participation on the likelihood of staying six years, while Buddin and 
Kapur (2005) analyze the effect of participation on the likelihood of staying a fifth year after 
already completing four years with the Navy. Even in the absence of these complications, 
generalizing results from the Armed Services to civilian workers is difficult due to the 
fundamentally different employment relationship. 
Benson, Finegold and Mohrman (2004) present a civilian analysis of the impact of 
participation in tuition reimbursement on retention using a case study of a large U.S. 
manufacturing firm (roughly 10,000 employees). Employees at this firm have a high 
participation rate in the tuition program – nearly 60 percent – which may be due to the program’s 
unlimited reimbursement of tuition, stock rewards for degree completion, and the fact that the 
firm strives to be a leader in the provision of continued education for its workers. This number is 
also inflated because it includes individuals who took only a single course rather than limiting 
                                                 
12 Participation in the orientation session is not random, but is positively correlated with an individual’s intention to 
use the program, and thus also is correlated with the probability of staying in the Navy.    11 
the sample to those enrolled in a degree program. Hence, their study examines an atypical tuition 
reimbursement program in terms of characteristics and participation rates. Benson, Finegold and 
Mohrman (2004) use a Cox-proportional hazard model to analyze how degree completion affects 
the probability of leaving the firm between January 1996 and June 2000. They argue that 
promotion after degree completion would reduce the likelihood of leaving because it produces a 
better match between responsibilities and skills sets.  However, their theory falls short of fully 
explaining their empirical findings. They find that promotion decreases the likelihood of leaving 
for employees who obtain a graduate degree. However, these individuals have a greater 
likelihood of leaving than non-participants. Additionally, promotion does not affect the 
likelihood of leaving for those employees earning a bachelor’s or associate’s degree. More 
importantly, their assumption that hazard rates are proportional might not be appropriate. They 
claim there is a sharp increase in the hazard upon degree completion, which suggests that the 
effect of participation on the separation hazard is not proportional over time. 
  While few studies examine tuition reimbursement programs, there have been many 
studies that examine the provision of general skills training by employers. These studies develop 
models in which a variety of mechanisms, such as asymmetric information or mobility costs, 
could create a wedge between wages and productivity. This wedge provides firms with an 
incentive to offer and pay for general skills training.
13 These studies relax Becker’s assumption 
that labor market is competitive to explain why firms offer general training.  
This paper contributes to the literature by empirically evaluating the effect of employer-
provided general training – provided through tuition reimbursement programs – on employee 
retention. If general training decreases employee turnover then a central prediction of Becker’s 
model is incorrect. In order to continue to use this standard theory, it would need to be amended 
to account for this negative relationship between general training and turnover. Allowing for 
general human capital and firm-specific human capital to interact is one possible amendment, 
which is addressed in Section 6.  
 
                                                 
13 These include, but are not limited to: Black and Lynch (1998), Loewenstein and Spletzer (1999) and Acemoglu 
and Pischke (1999a, 1999b), Autor(2001), and Cappelli (2004).   12 
4.0  Case Study Program: CSP  
 
  To examine the impact of tuition reimbursement programs on employee retention, this 
paper analyses data from a single firm as well as from a cross-section of firms. This section 
focuses on the case study, presenting the program characteristics, an econometric framework, 
and the results. The data were obtained from a non-profit institution in the education sector, 
which implemented a tuition reimbursement program in September 1999. (The case study 
program will be referred to as CSP in the remainder of the text.)  Employees considered in this 
analysis are staff members in supervisory and non-supervisory positions who were employed on 
December 15, 1999, and those who were hired between December 15, 1999 and September 1, 
2001.  A panel of observations was constructed based on seven “point-in-time” observations 
from administrative records. Individuals are observed on December 15 of each year from 1999 to 
2005. The data include gender, age, and race as well as start date, job characteristics, and annual 
wage rates. One shortcoming of the data is that those employees who start and end employment 
between December 15 of one year and December 15 of the subsequent year are not included in 
the sample. Individual records of participation in CSP include the amount reimbursed, the degree 
type, and the major or area of concentration from September 1, 1999 to August 31, 2004.
14 Total 
expenditure on tuition reimbursement over these five years totaled over $2 million dollars 
(nominal) with a participation rate of 4.5 percent. 
   
4.1  Characteristics of CSP and Descriptive Statistics 
 
As mentioned in Section 2, employees are required to have one year of service to be 
eligible for CSP.  Employees need to be admitted into a degree program, but the program does 
not need to be job-related. The intent of CSP at the case study institution is given below: 
[CSP] supports employee development by providing partial or full reimbursement of 
costs of courses, seminars and workshops that enable employees to improve performance 
in current jobs, prepare for career development, or meet requirements of degree programs 
related to current performance or planned career development (Administrative Guide 
Memo 22.11). 
 
                                                 
14 Major or area of concentration was not available for 22 participants.   13 
The employee’s supervisor must approve the request to participate in CSP, but this is not a 
binding constraint since the employee can appeal directly to the benefits department for 
reimbursement if her supervisor does not grant the request.  A staff member working full-time 
(more than 30 hours per week) qualifies for $5,250 in reimbursement per year; this amount is 
pro-rated for members working part-time. The maximum reimbursement amount was $2,000 for 
the first two years of the program, September 1, 1999 through August 31, 2001, but was 
increased to $5,250 as of September 1, 2001.  CSP qualifies under Section 127 of the Internal 
Revenue Code, allowing reimbursements to be exempt from income and payroll taxation  
Under CSP, reimbursements are only allowable for costs of tuition fees. Tuition 
reimbursements are made directly to the institution prior to the quarter or semester.  The 
employee assumes responsibility of satisfactory completion of the course (grade C or better); if 
not, the funds must be repaid in total to the employer.  
Table 2 displays sample means for workers used in the case study analysis. Participants 
in CSP differ from non-participating employees in terms of observable demographic and 
employment variables. Participants are more likely to be female, younger, identify themselves as 
Black, have a lower starting wage and are less likely to be in a supervisory role.
15  Of those who 
participate between September 1, 1999 through August 31, 2004, average total reimbursement 
was approximately $5,200 and participants spend an average of two years in the program. The 
participation rate of an employee’s peers is also higher for participants. Peer groups were 
constructed using both the location of an employee’s department and the general classification of 
her job to define a group of workers whose participation behavior could influence that individual 
employee’s participation decision, such as through the dissemination of information about the 
program. The peer participation rate assigned to each employee does not include that particular 
employee’s participation behavior. This variable will be used later in the paper as an exclusion 
restriction for the separation equation in the econometric analysis.  
  Tables 3 and 4 show the retention behavior of non-participants and participants. The raw 
data show that participants are less likely to leave in each year compared to non-participants. The 
largest difference in the leaving percentages occurs for the three-year time window, but the 
                                                 
15 “Exempt” and “Non-exempt” refer to whether the employee is subject to the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 
(FLSA), which establishes minimum wage and over-time pay laws for full-time and part-time workers in the private 
and government sectors. Workers who are non-exempt from FLSA are those paid on an hourly basis and occupy 
non-supervisory positions; salary of exempt workers must also meet the minimum wage.    14 
difference still persists for the five-year mark. Whether the worker separates from the institution 
before five years is the outcome evaluated in this study. Unfortunately, the data do not contain 
information on degree completion, so the retention behavior of participants after completing their 
coursework cannot be directly examined. The five-year time window is used as an approximation 
for degree completion. 
  Figures 1 and 2 graphically show differences between participants and non-participants in 
their propensities to separate from the institution using plots of the survival functions. These 
survival functions use actual employment start dates, but end dates are randomly assigned for the 
year in which the employee leaves the institution to produce a smoothed curve.
16  The survival 
function of participants lies to the right of non-participants, meaning that for any year of service, 
participants are more likely to still be employed by the institution.  Differences in survival rates 
are largest just before three years of service.   
Figures 3 and 4 show that survival rates differ by the type of degree pursued: participants 
in undergraduate programs have higher survival rates than those in graduate programs.  The 
analysis in the next section examines whether this difference between degrees persists when 
controlling for characteristics of the participants. While these tables and figures show lower 
survival rates for non-participants, a proper analysis of the effect of participation on retention 
needs to account for differences across individuals and the interdependence of the participation 
and retention decision. The next section of the paper will examine how participation affects 
retention using econometric analyses to control for differences in observable characteristics as 
well as unobservable characteristics.  
 
4.2  Estimation 
 
  This section models the event of an employee leaving the institution using a latent 
variable framework.  The individual compares the utility from staying with the employer to that 
obtained from separating. The propensity to separate from the employer is a continuous variable, 
but the observed outcome is binary, taking a value equal to 1 if the individual separates, and 
equal to 0 otherwise. The likelihood of leaving depends on observable characteristics, X, 
                                                 
16 For employees hired before September 1999, length of service is measured as the difference between 
implementation of the program (September 1, 1999) and end date, or censoring date (December 15, 2005) when 
relevant.    15 
participation in CSP, P, and factors unobservable to the researcher, ε. Let S* be the underlying 
index – unobservable to the researcher – that determines whether the individual separates from 
the employer within a specified time frame:   
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If we assume ε to have a standard normal distribution, then we can estimate how worker 
characteristics affect the probability of separating from the institution using a probit model.  
  The same framework can be applied to participation in CSP because participation is also 
a binary outcome.  Let P* be the underlying latent variable that determines whether the 
individual participates, while Z represents individual characteristics and let u be unobservable 
characteristics. Again, the individual compares the utility from participating to that from not 
participating. 
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            (4) 
As with the analysis of the probability of separation, determinants of participation can be 
examined using a probit model if u has a standard normal distribution. 
  If participation in CSP were exogenous in equation 1, then α would measure the effect of 
participation in CSP on the probability of separation. For participation to be exogenous, the 
decision to participate cannot be related to the decision to leave the employer in terms of 
unobservable characteristics, or cov(ε,u) = 0.  However, because participation in CSP affects 
employment and promotion opportunities due to an increase in general skills, arguing that the 
two decisions are uncorrelated is tenuous. This paper models the two decisions jointly, allowing 
for participation in CSP to be endogenous in equation 1, or that cov(ε,u) ≠ 0.  The distribution of  
(ε,u) is assumed to be  bivariate standard normal with cov(ε,u) = corr(ε,u) = ρ, or that: 
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Equations 1 and 2 are estimated jointly using bivariate probit maximum likelihood estimation. 
Garcia, Arkes and Trost (2000) and Buddin and Kapur (2005) use this technique in their studies 
of the U.S. Navy. In order to estimate the model, Z in equation 3 needs to include a variable that 
affects the likelihood of participating, but does not affect the likelihood of leaving (i.e. not 
contained in X from equation 1). This paper uses an information effect or knowledge “spillover”, 
measured by the participation rate of peers, to satisfy this exclusion restriction. Peer groups were 
created based on the division (18 in total) in which the employee worked and a broadly defined 
job classification (administrative, professional, researcher, or manager). The participation rate of 
peers attached to each individual does not include the participation decision of that particular 
individual. This rate is used as a measure of how informed an individual is about CSP.
17
  Because the sample consists of both employees hired before and after the implementation 
of CSP, the empirical analysis will be conducted on two groups: 1) employees hired before 
September 1, 1999; and 2) employees hired after September 1, 1999. The groups need to be 
separated because, as discussed in Section 3, implementation of CSP could affect the applicant 
pool. The effect of CSP on retention for future hires will be determined based on results 
collected from the second group, which is the measure most applicable to firms who have an 
established program. If a firm is considering implementing a tuition reimbursement program, the 
effect of CSP on current and future workers is relevant.  
 
4.3  Results from Case Study 
 
The first set of results estimate the effect of participation in CSP on the probability of 
separating from the employer (voluntarily or involuntarily) within 5 years when participation is 
treated as exogenous. Table 5 lists the marginal effects from a simple probit estimation with 
leave as the dependent variable. For workers hired before CSP was implemented, S = 1 if they 
separate from institution within five years measured from September 1, 1999; and = 0 otherwise. 
                                                 
17 The direction of the effect in unclear: Does the participation of peers inform the individual or does participation 
by the individual inform her peers? While it does not matter for the purposes of this study, a robustness check was 
performed that assigned participation rates by workers hired before September 1, 1999 in the first year of the 
program (1999) to new hires. Because these new hires were not eligible to participate in the first year due to the 
eligibility rule while the existing employees were, the direction of this information effect is clear.  By distinguishing 
between these two cohorts, concerns regarding whether the individual and her peer group experience the same shock 
to their participation probabilities are also mitigated. This alternative measure of peer participation does not affect 
the results.   17 
For workers hired after implementation, S = 1 if separate within five years of hire date; and S = 0 
otherwise.  Individual and employment characteristics, such as age, wage, and years of service, 
are taken as of December 15 of the first year observed. Participation in CSP is equal to 1 if the 
individual ever participated in the program from September 1, 1999 through August 31, 2003. 
This definition of participation is used because when workers participate, they typically spend 
the maximum amount possible, which corresponds to a binary decision.
18  
As seen in Table 5, if participation in CSP were exogenous, participation would lower the 
probability of leaving by over 20 percentage points for employees hired before or after 
September 1, 1999. This impact on retention is equivalent to the effect of being three and a half 
years older, or having six additional years of experience (as of December 15, 1999) for those 
employees hired before September, 1999.  For recent hires, the effect is similar to being four and 
half years older. 
  Table 6 separates the effect of undergraduate and graduate degrees on retention assuming 
exogeneity of participation. The effect of pursuing an undergraduate degree in CSP is roughly 
one and a half times as large as the effect of pursuing a graduate degree across the two groups. 
However, if participation is endogenous, these estimates of how participation in CSP affects 
retention are inconsistent.  
Tables 7 and 8 display the marginal effects from the bivariate probit maximum likelihood 
estimation for employees hired before and after September 1, 1999, which allows for an 
interdependence between participation and retention decisions. For those hired before 
implementation of CSP, the probability of participation is significantly higher for females 
(relative to males) and Blacks (relative to those identifying themselves as White), and lower for 
Asians and for those with higher weekly wages. While the magnitude of the marginal effects 
appears small, they are influential when compared to the average participation rate of 4.5 
percent.  The probability of participating in CSP increases in step with the participation rate of 
peers. The probability of leaving is decreasing (at a decreasing rate) in age and experience, and is 
lower for Hispanics and Asians. At mean values, a $500 dollar increase in the weekly starting 
wage increases the probability of leaving by one percent.  
                                                 
18 The results do not change when spending as a percent of the maximum reimbursement amount is used instead of 
the binary indicator.   18 
The impact of participation in CSP on retention is estimated as negative for both groups 
and significantly different from zero for those hired after the program was implemented (hired 
after September 1, 1999). As opposed to the estimates in Table 5 when participation is assumed 
to be exogenous, the estimated effect of participation in CSP is only slightly negative and not 
significantly different from zero for those employees hired before September 1, 1999. The 
change in the magnitude can be attributed to the correlation between the unobservable 
characteristics. A negative correlation implies that individuals (those hired before September 1, 
1999) who participate in CSP were those predisposed to staying at the institution.  
  For those hired after September 1, 1999, participation in CSP is significantly higher for 
workers in a non-supervisory role and is increasing in wage (Table 8). Participation in CSP has a 
large effect on retention: it reduces the probability of separating within five years by 50 
percentage points. The correlation between the error terms is positive and significant at the ten 
percent level. A positive correlation implies that those individuals who are more likely to 
participate in CSP are more inclined to leave within 5 years.  
  The estimated effect of participation in CSP on retention in Tables 7 and 8 is a 
specification in which the type of degree pursued does not matter for separation rates. A second 
specification is found in Tables 9 through 12, which allows the effect to vary by degree pursued. 
Tables 9 and 10 give the estimate for how pursuing an undergraduate in CSP affects retention. 
The effect is large and negative for both groups of hires: the probability of leaving within five 
years is reduced by over 40 percent for those hired before September 1, 1999, and nearly 60 
percent for recent hires. The correlation between the error terms is positive for both groups, 
meaning that those most likely to participate are those predisposed to separating from the 
institution. 
  The effects of pursuing a graduate degree in CSP on retention are listed in Tables 11 and 
12. Unlike undergraduate degrees, the effect of pursuing a graduate degree differs across the two 
cohorts of employees. For those hired before CSP was implemented, pursuing a graduate degree 
increases the probability of leaving the institution by 22 percentage points; although, the effect is 
not statistically significant at conventional levels.  The correlation between the errors is negative 
for this group, meaning that those who are more likely to pursue a graduate degree are also more 
likely to stay.    19 
For those hired after September 1, 1999, pursuing a graduate degree reduces the 
probability of leaving within five years by fifty percent. Similar to undergraduate degrees, the 
correlation between the errors is positive. Hence, those employees pursuing graduate degrees 
who were hired before September 1, 1999 behave differently from the other three groups of 
participants.
19  
   These results indicate that participation in CSP increases retention for those employees 
hired after the program was implemented, and for those employees hired before implementation 
who choose to pursue undergraduate degrees.  This analysis shows that participation in CSP is 
endogenous: the correlation between the error terms is positive for the aforementioned groups. 
Because of this endogeneity, single-equation estimation of the effect of CSP on the probability of 
separation underestimates the impact of participation on retention due to the positive correlation 
between the error terms. Participation in CPS decreases the probability of separating from the 
employer within 5 years by 50 percentage points when participation is allowed to be 
endogenous, up from 20 percent point decrease in the probability of separation when 
participation is treated exogenously. Hence, the effect of CSP on retention is even larger in 
magnitude when we take into account the correlation between the unobservable factors contained 
in the error terms.  
  For those employees hired before implementation of CSP who pursue graduate degrees, 
CSP reduces retention. The correlation between the unobserved heterogeneity affecting 
participation and separation is negative for these workers, which means that those more likely to 
participate are less likely to separate from the institution within five years. When treated 
exogenously, participation appears to decrease the probability of leaving by 18 percentage 
points; however, when participation is modeled as endogenous, participation increases the 
probability of leaving by nearly 22 percentage points. Hence, participation in CSP accelerates 
departure from the institution for those existing employees who choose to pursue graduate 
degrees.  
  This case study finds that tuition reimbursement programs increase retention of new 
hires. Hence, this paper finds empirical support for the explanation given by firms for providing 
tuition reimbursement programs – to increase employee retention – despite the predictions of the 
                                                 
19 This difference could be explained by dynamics leading to the implementation of CSP, which is currently being 
explored.   20 
standard theory of human capital that provision of general training could increase turnover. It is 
important to note that implementation of a program appears to affect existing and future 
employees differentially. This difference provides some evidence that tuition programs affect the 
composition of a firm’s applicant pool.  However, this evidence is not fully conclusive due to the 
fact that it only applies to those workers pursuing graduate degrees.   
  Because CSP is a typical program in terms of its characteristics, this paper’s findings 
improve the literature’s understanding of tuition reimbursement programs and their effect on 
retention, especially for civilian employees. However, the conclusions from a case study may not 
be generalized to all firms. The following section tests whether the conclusion of this case study 
is supported by SEPT95, a dataset containing training information from over 1000 
establishments.   
 
5.0  Analysis using Survey of Employer-Provided Training, 1995 (SEPT95) 
 
5.1  Information on SEPT95 
 
  SEPT95 was conducted by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), part of the U.S. 
Department of Labor, and sponsored by the Employment Training Administration with the 
purpose of collecting nationally representative data on employer-provided training practices 
(Bureau of Labor Statistics, Press Release July 10, 2006).  The sample represents establishments 
employing 50 or more workers; smaller employers were not sampled because previous research 
has shown that they seldom offer formal training.   
  The survey consisted of personal visits conducted from May to October in 1995 of 
private, nonagricultural business establishments. The 1995 survey was the second Survey of 
Employer-Provided Training; the first, conducted in 1994, collected information on types of 
formal training provided or financed by establishments in 1993.  The two surveys differ in that 
SEPT95 collected information from both employers and randomly selected employees.    
  In SEPT95, establishments report expenditures on training for 1994: payments for wages 
and salaries of in-house trainers, payments to outside trainers, spending on tuition 
reimbursement, and payments to training funds.  In addition to information on formal training, 
the employer questionnaire collected information on firm characteristics, such as benefits, work   21 
practices, occupation composition, and employee turnover. While SEPT95 collected a training 
log from establishments, as well as two questionnaires and training logs from randomly selected 
employees, this paper only uses responses to the employer questionnaire in its analysis because 
the other survey instruments have lower response rates.
20 A sample of 1,433 establishments was 
drawn.  Usable employer questionnaires totaled 1,062, giving a response rate of  74.1 percent. 
Twelve observations were dropped subsequently for this paper’s analysis.
21 Detailed information 
on the universe of firms and sampling procedure is provided in the appendix. 
  To obtain information on wages, this analysis merged average quarterly wage data from 
the Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages (QCEW) from 1993, 4
th quarter, which was 
when the sample of establishments was drawn. Average wages were computed by dividing total 
wages in the 4
th quarter of 1993 by the sum of monthly employment over this quarter (average 
“monthly” wage). Access to these wage data was not available for all firms due to variation in 
confidentiality restrictions across States.
22 
  Few authors have used the data collected by SEPT95, likely due to their classification as 
restricted data.
23  Economists employed by the BLS conducted the two studies that make prior 
use of the data: Frazis et al. (1998) and Frazis, Gittleman, Joyce (2000). These two studies relate 
firm and employee characteristics to provision and receipt of training. Frazis et al. (1998) is a 
descriptive paper and documents provision and spending on formal training. During 1994, 
establishments with 50 or more employees spent $139 per employee on wages and salaries of in-
house trainers, $98 per employee on payments to outside trainers, and $51 per employee on 
tuition reimbursement. They find evidence of economies of scale in the provision of formal 
training: larger firms are more likely to provide formal training, and employees at larger firms 
spend a greater percentage of their training hours in formal training. High-benefit employers and 
those using innovative workplace practices, such as total quality management and work teams, 
are more likely to offer training. They find a negative relationship between the provision of 
                                                 
20 Sample attrition for these other three instruments could be related to the amount of training done at the firm. This 
paper only uses the responses to the employee questionnaire, which has the highest response rates, to minimize the 
problem of non-random attrition. 
21 Two were dropped because employment reported in 1995 dropped to one employee, and an additional ten 
observations were dropped due to outliers in the number of reported hires relative to current employment. 
22 Wage data was acquired for 833 firms. Colorado, Michigan, New Hampshire, New York, Oregon, Pennsylvania, 
Vermont, Washington, and Wyoming did not allow access to QCEW. 
23 Analysis of SEPT95 requires approval from the BLS that its use will not jeopardize the confidentiality of its 
respondents; all analysis using SEPT95 must be conducted onsite at the BLS office in Washington, D.C.    22 
training and turnover using both the employee and employer survey instruments. Employees 
working at high turnover establishments receive less training, and these establishments report a 
lower provision of training than firms with low or medium turnover rates. However, the direction 
of causation between training and turnover cannot be determined from a simple correlation. 
Frazis, Gittleman, and Joyce (2000) provide a clearer picture of how firm characteristics 
relate to the provision and intensity of training by using multivariate regression analysis. Their 
main findings mirror those of Frazis et al. (1998); they consistently find a positive relationship 
between training and fringe benefits and high-performance work practices, whether they look at 
incidence or intensity, receipt or provision of training.  
To give credibility to these data, Frazis, Gittleman, and Joyce (2000) relate estimates of 
training from SEPT95 to other survey results.  Results from SEPT95 show that 93 percent of 
establishments with 50 or more employees provided some type of formal training activity in the 
12 months prior to being surveyed in 1995. Studies using the 1994 EQW-NES report that 81 
percent of establishments with 20 or more employees offer formal training (Black and Lynch, 
1998). The disparity between these two estimates is attributed to the difference in the size of 
employers surveyed, because the definition of formal training is similar across the two surveys.
24 
The Small Business Administration (SBA) Survey of training in 1992 finds that only 43 percent 
of firms employing 100 or more workers provide formal training. The estimates from SEPT95 
and SBA differ substantially; Frazis, Gittleman and Joyce (2000) argue that the divergence 
between these estimates stems from differences in the type of training program being reported: 
SBA asks about training programs, while SEPT95 asks about any type of formal training 
activity. A training program could imply a curriculum with multiple courses for instructing a 
number of participants; in contrast, a solitary incident of training would result in an affirmative 
response to the SEPT95 survey question.  
Information on tuition reimbursement programs provided by firms is difficult to obtain 
due to the proprietary nature of training practices; SEPT95 provides a limited opportunity for an 
analysis of this general training program. In SEPT95, firms indicate whether they offer a tuition 
                                                 
24 The two results are compatible because the provision of training increases with firm size due to economies of 
scale (Frazis et al. 1998).   23 
reimbursement program as a part of their formal training programs, and also report total 
expenditures on reimbursements for 1994.
25   
Using sample weights, 61 percent of establishments with 50 or more employees offer 
tuition reimbursement and 46 percent had positive expenditures on reimbursements in 1994. The 
remainder of the analysis does not use sample weights and instead focuses on the relative 
characteristics of respondents.  Seventy-five percent of respondents offer a tuition reimbursement 
program, but 14 percent of these firms had zero expenditures on reimbursements in 1994. 
Unfortunately, SEPT95 does not contain information on the specifics of these tuition 
reimbursement programs so these data cannot be used to evaluate how plan characteristics affect 
participation rates. However, expenditures of $0 for 1994 imply a participation rate of zero for 
the entire year. To be considered as having a tuition reimbursement program in this analysis, 
firms must indicate that they have a program and have positive expenditures in 1994. Using this 
requirement, 64 percent of establishments have an “operational” tuition reimbursement program.  
Table 13 shows mean characteristics of respondents. The third and fourth columns of 
Table 13 show the mean value of firm characteristics by whether the firm has a tuition 
reimbursement program. Firms with a tuition reimbursement program offer more benefits, have 
higher wages, have lower separation rates and have more employees than firms without a 
program.
26 Table 14 shows how provision of tuition reimbursement programs varies by industry. 
Industries that are more production intensive, such as mining and manufacturing, are more likely 
to offer this program. The financial, insurance, and real estate industry also has a high incidence, 
which probably reflects the certifications and licensing required in these jobs. Because provision 
varies by industry and the degree of firm-specificity is arguable higher in productive intensive 
jobs, these findings suggest that general skills acquired through tuition reimbursement are used 
to complement firm-specific skills.  
Whether tuition reimbursement is provided in conjunction with other training programs is 
another way to assess whether these programs are related firm-specific human capital. If tuition 
reimbursement programs are offered as a complement to other training programs, rather than as a 
substitute, then there is likely an interaction between firm-specific and general skills training. 
                                                 
25 The National Employer Survey used by Black and Lynch (1998) and Cappelli (2004) asks whether the firm 
reimburses tuition for employees, but does not collect information on expenditures. 
26 Separation rate = (current employment + hires – previous employment)/(.5*(current employment + previous 
employment), where previous employment is the number of employees on staff three months prior to survey.    24 
Table 13 shows that firms with tuition reimbursement programs are both more likely to hire 
trainers from outside the firm and to employ in-house trainers.
27  Table 15 gives results from a 
simple probit model relating the provision of tuition reimbursement to establishment 
characteristics, including other types of training provided by the establishment. The probability 
of offering a tuition program is nearly twenty percentage points higher for firms that also hire 
outside trainers and ten percentage points higher for those with in-house trainers. Hence, tuition 
reimbursement programs are offered in conjunction with other training practices. These results 
regarding the determinants of providing tuition reimbursement are consistent with tuition 
reimbursement programs being used to complement investments in firm-specific human capital, 
thereby increasing worker productivity at the current firm. This discussion will be revisited in 
Section 6 of this paper. 
 
5.2   Econometric Framework and Results 
 
  Similar to problems confronted in the case study when estimating how participation in 
CSP affects retention, estimating the effect of tuition reimbursement on separation rates for firms 
in SEPT95 needs to address the problem of an endogenous right-hand side variable. First, 
suppose program provision is exogenous and the effect of tuition reimbursement on separation 
rates is estimated by running OLS on equation 6. 
 
   i i i i u tuition X rate separation + + =    
'           (6) 
 
In the above equation, X is a vector of firm characteristics, tuition is a binary variable that equals 
1 if the firm has a tuition reimbursement program with positive expenditures in 1994, and u is an 
error term. Table 16 shows the results from an OLS regression of separation rates on firm 
characteristics, including tuition reimbursement. The OLS estimates shows that the relationship 
between tuition reimbursement programs and separation rates is negative and significant. Using 
the mean separation rate (0.110) as a benchmark, the OLS estimates imply that tuition 
reimbursement programs are associated with nearly a 35 percent lower separation rate. Including 
                                                 
27 Firms are classified as hiring an outside trainer if they had positive expenditures for this training category in 1994; 
similarly for expenditures on in-house trainers (fulltime or part-time).   25 
establishment wage in the regression does not change the result. These estimates, however, 
assume that provision of tuition reimbursement is exogenous. 
Recall that increasing employee retention is a primary reason for why firms implement 
tuition reimbursement programs. This suggests that unobservable firm heterogeneity causing 
higher separation rates is positively correlated with unobservable determinants of providing 
tuition reimbursement. This implies that the decision by the firm to provide tuition 
reimbursement is endogenous. In addition, the degree to which skills used by workers in 
production are firm-specific affects both separation rates and investment in general skills 
training. However, because firm-specificity is not directly observable, it is absorbed into both 
error terms, which is another reason why the provision of tuition reimbursement is endogenous 
in the separation rate equation.  
Equations 7 and 8 model a firm’s decision to offer a tuition reimbursement program, 
where X and Z are vectors of exogenous variables and v is an error term.
28 
 
  j j j j Z X tuition       + + =
' ' *               (7) 
 
where tuition is a binary variable and tuition* is a latent index related by the following:  

















           (8) 
As argued above, tuition is endogenous in equation 6.  Because tuition is a binary variable, it is 
referred to as a “dummy endogenous variable” and needs to be handled in a self-selection 
framework. Roy (1951) presents an early discussion of self-selection in the context of 
occupational choice and his framework has been used extensively to in the program evaluation 
literature. He shows that occupational differences in earnings cannot be estimated by comparing 
the average wages of those workers in occupation A to occupation B because workers self-select 
into the occupation that gives them the highest payoff. In order to estimate the return to an 
occupation for a randomly selected individual, one needs to take into account the covariance 
                                                 
28 Establishment wage is not included in the estimation of either equation 6 or 7 because it is endogenous in both 
equations if the error term contains a measure of firm-specific human capital.   26 
between the unobservable characteristics that affect occupation selection and the unobservable 
characteristics that affect wages.  
  To estimate the effect of tuition reimbursement on separation rates, this paper assumes 
the error terms in equations 6 and 7 are distributed bivariate normal with mean zero and 
covariance matrix given by:  
     
 
 









   
 
 
   
 
 
   
 
 















The effect of tuition reimbursement programs on separation rates (δ from equation 6) estimated 
in this framework is the “average treatment effect”, or the effect of tuition programs on 
separation rates for establishments selected at random. Identification of δ requires that at least 
one variable or factor affects the provision of tuition reimbursement, but does not affect 
separation rates (e.g. elements of vector Z, which is included in equation 7 but excluded from 
equation 6). This condition is difficult to satisfy with the establishment-level characteristics 
collected in SEPT95, because training and workplace conditions are related to separation rates. 
However, variation across States provides some hope.  
  Recall that the definition of tuition reimbursement used in this analysis is that firms must 
offer the program and have paid reimbursements in 1994. Because participation in tuition 
reimbursement programs is voluntary, positive expenditures on reimbursements by the 
establishment indicate a demand for continued education by workers. If demand for education by 
workers at the establishment is affected by the educational attainment of peers (or fellow 
citizens), then the probability of having positive expenditures on tuition reimbursement will be 
increasing in the State’s educational attainment. This paper uses educational attainment by the 
adult population as one set of exclusion restrictions, which includes the percent of adults (25 
years or older) in the State with a bachelor’s degree or higher in 1990 and the percent change 
from 1990 to 2000 computed from the U.S. Census.
29   
In addition, the return to education was estimated for each State using the 1994 Current 
Population Survey.  The estimated return to education is the coefficient on years of schooling in 
                                                 
29 Data were constructed using American Fact Finder, Summary 3 File for 1990 and 2000 Decennial Censes 
(www.census.gov).    27 
a simple Mincer equation.
30  The relationship between provision of tuition reimbursement and 
return to education is expected to be positive because workers’ demand for continued education 
is increasing in the return schooling. Returns to schooling along with educational attainment by 
State comprise the other set of exclusion restrictions.  Table 17 shows the means for these 
variables; the level and change in educational attainment, as well as the estimated return to 
education, are higher for firms with tuition reimbursement programs.  
  Table 18 shows the estimated probability of a firm offering a tuition reimbursement 
program using a probit model. Two sets of results are shown, one for each set of exclusion 
restrictions. In both equations, the exclusion restrictions are jointly significant.
31 The probability 
of offering a tuition reimbursement program increases with the educational attainment of adults 
in 1990, the percentage change from 1990 to 2000, and the estimated return to education by 
State. 
  Tables 19 and 20 show the results from the bivariate probit maximum likelihood 
estimation using the two sets of exclusion restrictions. After controlling for the endogeneity of 
program provision, the effect of tuition reimbursement programs on retention is even larger: 
positive spending on tuition reimbursement reduces separation rates by .075 points. Using the 
mean separation rate of 0.110 as a basis of comparison, these programs reduce separation rates 
by nearly 70 percent. The covariance between the unobservable firm characteristics that affect 
program provision and separation rates is estimated to be positive. This positive covariance is 
due to the simultaneous relationship between separation rates and provision of tuition of 
reimbursement. Because offering tuition reimbursement is endogenous, OLS underestimates the 
effect of tuition reimbursement programs on separation rates. The results from SEPT95 are 
consistent with the finding from the case study: tuition reimbursement programs increase 
employee retention.   
Estimation by instrumental variables is also used in the literature to estimate the effect of 
a binary endogenous variable on an outcome of interest. Unlike the analysis above which makes 
a distributional assumption to estimate the average effect of tuition programs on separation rates, 
instrumental variables does not require an assumption about the distribution of unobservable 
                                                 
30 To estimate the return to education, ln(wage) was regressed on years of schooling, by state. Because the estimated 
parameter enters the reduced form equation and is not a parameter of interest in this analysis, the simple 
specification of the wage equation is not problematic. Results are presented with and without this exclusion 
restriction. 
31 These instruments were found to be jointly significant using a likelihood ratio test: p-values of 0.0123 and 0.0117.    28 
characteristics. However, in order to interpret the estimated effect of a binary endogenous 
treatment as an average treatment effect using instrumental variables, one must assume that the 
effect of the treatment is homogenous. Homogeneity of treatment implies that the effect of the 
treatment would be the same for those who opted for treatment (binary variable = 1) and for 
those who opted not to treat. In the case of tuition reimbursement programs, if those firms that 
offer tuition reimbursement have unobservable characteristics that make investment in general 
human capital more effective at increasing worker productivity (i.e. the presence of firm-specific 
human capital) than at firms that do not offer tuition reimbursement, then assuming that the 
effect is homogenous is tenuous. Using instrumental variables, the effect of tuition 
reimbursement on separation rate is quite large in magnitude: -0.26 (over double the mean 
separation rate). When the homogeneity assumption is violated, instrumental variables estimates 
the “local average treatment effect”, which is only clearly interpretable in certain policy 
evaluations.
32  Hence, when the effect of a treatment is heterogeneous, instrumental variables is 
estimating a parameter different from the average treatment effect.    
 
5.3  Case Study and Cross Section Results: Combining Two Perspectives 
 
 
The results from the case study and cross-section analyses tell a consistent story: tuition 
reimbursement programs increase employee retention. However, the two analyses evaluate the 
effect from different perspectives. The first compares the separation behavior of participants 
relative to non-participants, while the second compares separation rates at establishments with a 
program to those without. The cross-section analysis is a comparison across establishments 
rather than a comparison within establishments.  
The case study shows that workers who are predisposed to having a higher probability of 
separating from the institution are more likely to participate in the tuition program. This 
suggests that these workers may have intended to acquire general skills through tuition 
reimbursement to make a career or firm change. However, participation substantially reduces 
the probability of leaving after five years. This is consistent with participants accumulating 
firm-specific human capital during the time period before they become eligible and during 
                                                 
32 The local average treatment effect (LATE), which was introduced by Imbens and Angrist (1994), measures the 
average treatment effect for those who would be induced to treat (binary variable = 1) by changes in the value of the 
instrument (Wooldridge, 2002).   29 
participation in the program, as well as possibly due to the increase in productivity of firm-
specific skills from the interaction of these skills with general skills acquired through tuition 
reimbursement. Because those who participate stand to gain the most from participation in 
terms of wage increases and promotion opportunities, tuition reimbursement programs are 
effective at lowering the separation rate of the most ambitious employees. 
The cross-section analysis finds that positive spending on tuition reimbursement 
programs negatively affects separation rates. Because establishments implement tuition programs 
to affect separation rates, implementing a program at a randomly selected establishment has an 
even larger effect on separation rates. As described above, tuition reimbursement programs 
reduce the separation probabilities of the most “mobile” workers. However, because 
participation rates are typically less than five percent, the cross-section results imply that the 
program must also affect separation rates of non-participants.  
Allowing for workers to place a positive option value on future participation can explain 
the effect on non-participants. Non-participants at firms with a tuition program differ from 
workers at firms without a tuition program in terms of their separation rates because of this 
positive option value. Because reimbursement is tied to successful completion of coursework, the 
option value for many workers is zero. To the extent that the incidence of the cost of the program 
falls on the worker in the form of lower wages, workers with a zero option value will be less 
likely to work at firms with tuition reimbursement programs. Hence, program provision affects 
the type of worker attracted to the firm and this contributes to the effect on establishment 
separation rates. 
The cost of separation, or replacement cost of a worker, increases in the degree to which 
a firm uses firm-specific skills in production.  As seen in cross-section analysis, firms that use 
more firm-specific human capital in production are more likely to offer tuition reimbursement 
programs. If the stock of firm-specific human capital is increasing in tenure, then offering these 
general training programs increases investment in firm-specific capital of both participants and 
non-participants due to service length requirements, course duration, and increased tenure 
resulting from a positive option value on future participation. Therefore, separation rates decline 
and investment in firm-specific human capital increases. Depending on these two effects, firms 
could find it profitable to offer tuition reimbursement even if the full incidence of the cost of 
program falls on the firm.    30 
   
6.0  General Training and Turnover 
 
This section presents a mechanism that could result in general skills training increasing 
employee retention, which provides a context for interpreting the empirical finding that tuition 
reimbursement programs reduce turnover. By definition, general skills improve worker 
productivity at more than one potential employer. If employers provide general skills training in 
a competitive market, turnover would increase due to poaching of trained workers by outside 
firms (Becker 1964). The standard theory of investment in human capital implies that workers 
bear the full cost of general training due to this risk of poaching. Hence, turnover would be non-
decreasing in general skills training under standard human capital theory because the worker is 
indifferent between employers because skills are transferable. Pencavel (1972) first incorporates 
turnover into the firm’s set of choice variables, which implies that firms can reduce turnover 
rates by increasing compensation. He shows evidence that firms pick a wage-quit strategy, which 
depends on how costly turnover is to the firm, or how much firm-specific human capital is used 
in production. The use of tuition reimbursement programs to influence turnover requires that 
general skills training be more cost-effective at reducing turnover than wage increases. 
How could general skills decrease turnover? If workers use firm-specific human capital 
in production, mechanisms exist in which provision of general skills training could increase 
employee retention. Recall that investment in firm-specific skills lowers turnover because rents 
from the investment are shared between the worker and firm; both parties have an incentive to 
continue employment because rents only accrue if the relationship is maintained. If provision of 
general skills training by a firm increases the stock or productivity of firm-specific skills, then 
general skills training could reduce turnover.  
If complementarities exist between general and firm-specific human capital in 
production, general skills training could increase employee retention. Acemoglu and Pischke 
(1999a, 1999b) argue that if general and firm-specific human capital are complements, wage 
structures could become compressed, thereby giving firms an incentive to provide general skills 
training. Acemoglu and Pischke define compression in the wage structure to mean that profits   31 
from trained workers are higher than those from untrained workers.
33 With complementarities 
between general and specific human capital, general skills acquired through participation in 
tuition reimbursement could increase the productivity of firm-specific human capital, thereby 
increasing employee retention.  
As discussed in Section 5, the determinants of whether a firm offers a tuition 
reimbursement program appear to be related to technology and skills used in production. Firms 
in mining, manufacturing, and finance are more likely to offer these programs relative 
construction, wholesale, and retail.  Controlling for industry, firms with a higher fraction of 
professionals, managers, and administrative support are more likely to offer tuition 
reimbursement relative to firms with a higher fraction of sales, service, and production workers. 
In addition, firms that provide other types of training to their employees (even after controlling 
for industry) are more likely to offer tuition reimbursement. High-training firms with higher-
skilled workers that are in technology-intensive industries arguably require a greater amount of 
firm-specific human capital in production.  This suggests that firms provide general skills 
training to complement investments in firm-specific human capital.  
For motivation and clarity, the following is a simple model to outline how investment in 
the general human capital of employees in the presence of complementarities between firm-
specific and general human capital in production could increase employee retention. Suppose 
that a worker’s production at the current firm (c) is a simple function of her stock of general 
human capital (g) and firm-specific human capital (s), while production at any other potential 
employer (p) is a function only of her general human capital: 
) ( ) , ( s h g s g fC + = , where  0 ) ( ' ' 0 ) ( ' < > s h and s h        (9) 
g s g fP = ) , (                   (10) 
Since g is transferable across employers, workers with general skills g will be paid no less than a 
wage equal to the value of their marginal product. Normalizing the price of output to one, a 
worker’s outside wage option is g s g f wage P P = = ) , ( . At the current firm, rents from firm-
specific human capital will be shared between the worker and the firm. Her wage is given by: 
) ( ) , ( s h g s g f wage C C   + = =             (11) 
                                                 
33 Acemoglu and Pischke (1999a, 1999b) list several other market imperfections that could result in compressed 
wages, including search costs, mobility costs, and minimum wage laws.   
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Where  is the relative bargaining power of employees and 1 0 < <   .
34 Costs of the investment in 
firm-specific human capital are also shared, so h(s) is negative when the worker starts to 
accumulate firm-specific human capital. The worker pays her share of the investment in the form 
of a lower wage during training: she is paid a wage lower than her outside option, g, but above 
her actual productivity while in training. Thus, the firm contributes to its share of the investment 
cost by paying her a wage above her productivity initially. As rents accrue with the accumulation 
of firm-specific human capital, s, the worker and firm split the difference between the worker’s 
productivity at the current firm and her outside option, with the share being determined by the 
relative bargaining power. If the worker separates from her current firm, she will incur a wage 
loss of: 
  ) ( ) ( s h s loss   =                 (12) 
When s > s*, where s* is defined as the level of firm-specific capital such that  0 *) ( = s h , wage 
loss is increasing in s and the employee will not want to separate from the firm. 
Profits at the current firm from a worker with general human capital g and firm-specific 
human capital s are given by
35: 
  ) ( ) 1 ( )) ( ( ) ( s h s h g s h g C         = +   + =           (13) 
As in the case of the worker, the firm has an incentive to maintain the employment relationship 
when s > s* because profits are increasing in s after this point. Figure 5 shows productivity and 
wages with investment in firm-specific human capital at the current firm, as well as the outside 
option for the worker (i.e. g wageP = ), for a hypothetical production function, h(s). Notice that 
the outside option (or outside wage) is flat because there is no investment in general human 
capital in this case. The vertical axis measures the wage (or productivity), which has been 
normalized to 0 for a stock of general human capital equal to g.  
  Now suppose that general human capital and firm-specific human capital are 
complements in production. Worker productivity at the current firm becomes: 








    (14) 
                                                 
34 This condition needs to be satisfied because if  =0, the worker has no incentive to stay with the firm because his 
wage at the current firm is equal to his outside option, g. Similarly, the firm has no incentive to maintain the 
employment relationship if   =1. 
35 Because the market is competitive, profits at firms only employing general human capital are zero.   33 
The condition on the cross-partial derivative implies complementarities in production. Suppose 
the firm invests u in general human capital of its workers. Then the wage of the worker at the 
current firm and other potential employers becomes: 
) , ( ) , ( u g s h u g s g f wage C C + + + = =             (15) 
u g s g f wage P P + = = ) , (               (16) 
The wage loss incurred upon separation from the current employer is even larger under the 
complementarities assumption: 
  ) , ( ) 0 , ( ) , ( ) 0 , ( ) ( u g s h s h u g s loss s loss s loss + <   + <           (17) 
Hence, the employee has a greater incentive to stay with the current firm because her relative 
productivity at the current firms compared to other potential employers is higher with 
complementarities between general and firm-specific human capital. 
Because courses are typically taken outside of the firm, investment in general skills 
through tuition reimbursement does not decrease the worker’s productivity. However, the firm 
must pay for the reimbursement. With investment of u in general skills, the firm’s profits 
become: 
u u g s h u u g s h u g u g s h u g C   +   =   + + +   + + + = ) , ( ) 1 ( )) , ( ( ) , (         (18) 
Whether the firm will provide general training, u, depends on the present value of the additional 
rents accrued though  ) , ( u g s h +  relative to the cost u, as well as β. The firm’s incentive to 
continue the employment with the worker is greater under the complementarities assumption if: 
u u g s h s h u u g s h s h   + <     +   <   ) , ( ) 0 , ( ) , ( ) 1 ( ) 0 , ( ) 1 (         (19) 
Figure 6 displays the productivity and wages with complementarities between firm-
specific human capital and general human capital. Notice that the outside option is now 
increasing due to the investment in general skill by the firm. This figure does not include cost of 
investment in general skill, u, but the profits of the firm (excluding u) are represented by the area 
between  ) , ( u g s h + and the wage.  
    There are other mechanisms that could result in general skills training reducing turnover 
in the presence of firm-specific human capital. Lazear (2005) presents a model in which all skills 
are general, but how these skills are combined in production is specific to the firm. Hence, in his 
model providing general skills training is essentially equivalent to investing in firm-specific skills. 
Alternatively, firms could use general training as an insurance mechanism: if workers are   34 
reluctant to work at a firm which requires investment in firm-specific human capital due to the 
risk of wage loss in the event of involuntary separation, firms could offer general training as a 
way to mitigate this risk (Feuer, Glick, and Desai 1987).  Additionally, if providing general skills 
training attracts a type of worker who values investment in human capital, these workers likely 
have a lower discount rate, and thus could be less likely to turnover a priori. For the case of 
tuition reimbursement programs, participation could increase the amount of firm-specific skills if 
these skills increase over time because coursework takes several semesters to complete. Service 
length requirements before and after participation would add to this effect (Cappelli 2004). 
It is important to note that the presence of firm-specific human capital is not required for 
the provision of general training if other market imperfections are present (Acemoglu and 
Pischke 1999a, 1999b). While these rigidities, such as mobility costs, could explain why firms 
invest in general human capital of its workers, they cannot explain why the provision of general 
training reduces separation rates.  Evidence from SEPT95 indicates that firms who offer tuition 
reimbursement programs are more likely to offer other types of training programs (see Section 
5.1).  Because “high-training” firms are more likely to offer tuition reimbursement programs, this 
suggests that these firms rely more heavily on firm-specific skills in production. Testing this 
hypothesis explicitly would require developing an index of firm-specificity, which could then be 
related to the provision of tuition reimbursement programs.  
 
7.0  Concluding Remarks 
 
  Tuition reimbursement programs are a type of general training commonly offered by 
employers. Counter to the prediction of Becker’s theory of investment in human capital, firms 
claim that they use these programs to increase employee retention. Using case study and cross-
section analyses, this paper finds that provision of these general training programs increases 
employee retention. Results from the case study imply that participation in CSP substantially 
reduces the probability of separating from a firm: participation by those employees hired after 
the program was implemented reduced their probability of leaving within five years by over 50 
percentage points. Using the cross-section of establishments, this paper finds that positive 
spending on tuition reimbursement has a large negative effect on employee turnover: reduces   35 
separation rates by 70 percent. This result overturns the prediction of standard theory that 
investment in general human capital by firms increases turnover. 
  However, the establishment-level factors that determine which firms offer this general 
training program suggest that it is offered to complement investments in firm-specific human 
capital. By allowing for an interaction between firm-specific and general human capital, the 
empirical finding that general training reduces turnover can be interpreted within standard 
theory. Future work could test this amendment by explicitly evaluating how the use of firm-
specific human capital in production affects a firm’s probability of providing general skills 
training, such as tuition reimbursement programs. 
  The large estimated impact of tuition programs on retention implies that these programs 
affect the turnover rate of non-participants because participation rates are typically less than five 
percent. This implies that non-participants either intend to be participants in the future (i.e. they 
place a positive option value on participation) or that the provision of these programs improves 
the workplace environment or worker satisfaction.
36 Hence, non-participants at firms with tuition 
reimbursement programs are different from workers at firms without a tuition reimbursement 
program. Future work is needed to examine the strength of this “spill-over” effect, which might 
involve fieldwork and surveys of workers.  
                                                 
36 Tuition reimbursement program are offered by many of Fortune Magazine’s “Top 100 Companies to Work for”.    36 
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Appendix on SEPT95 Survey Methodology 
 
The universe of firms represented by the firms in SEPT95 are all private establishments 
in 50 U.S. states and the District of Columbia with 50 or more employees during the fourth 
quarter of 1993. The data was collected by experience field economics in BLS regional offices. 
Establishments were first contacted by telephone to request a personal visit to the establishment. 
The BLS economists administered the employer questionnaire using computer-assisted personal 
interviewing, while training log data were either collected during the visit or the log was left to 
be completed by the employer over the following two weeks. The availability and quality of 
existing training records and schedules determined this decision. 
   The sample was drawn from the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ Universe Data Base (UDB), 
and limited to firms with two-digit Standard Industrial Classifications (SIC codes) that indicated 
nonagricultural, private establishments.
37 The UDB is based on reports for Unemployment 
Insurance purposes to state Employment Security Agencies. The sample was drawn after 
stratifying the sample frame into categories based on industry and size.
38 A sample size of 170 
establishments was set for each of the 9 industries. Within industry, the sample was allocated to 
the employment classes approximately proportional to their total employment. Within each 
stratum, a sample was randomly selected. Each unit was given a Sampling Weight that was the 
ratio of the number of frame units to the number of sampled units. If the UDB entry contained 
more than one establishment, one of these was randomly selected for the sample. Each 
establishment was assigned a Sub-sampling Factor that was equal to the number of 
establishments in its frame unit. Each sampled establishment was assigned a 14-day contiguous 
interval within the reference period, May – October, 1995 (Bureau of Labor Statistics, July 10, 
2006).  
  There were 1,543 establishments selected, and 1,433 were eligible for the survey (out-of-
business or out of the scope of the universe resulted in exclusion). Usable employer 
                                                 
37 SIC Codes based on the 1987 SIC Manual include: Mining (SIC 10, 12-14); Construction (SIC 15-17); 
Nondurable Manufacturing (SIC 20-23, 26-31); Durable Manufacturing (24,25,32-39); Transportation and Public 
Utilities (SIC 41, 42, 44-49); Wholesale Trade (SIC 50-51); Retail Trade (SIC 52-59); Finance, Insurance, and Real 
Estate (SIC 60-65, 67); Services (SIC 07, 70, 72, 73, 75, 76, 78-84, 86, 87, 89). 
 
38 Five size classes: 1) 50 – 249; 2) 250-499; 3) 500 – 2499; 4) 2500 – 5000; 5) 5000 and above.  Nine industries: 1) 
Mining; 2) Construction; 3) Nondurable Manufacturing; 4) Durable Manufacturing; 5) Transportation and Public 
Utilities; 6) Wholesale Trade; 7) Retail Trade; 8) Financial, Insurance and Real Estate, and 9) Services.   
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questionnaires totaled 1,062, giving an adjusted response rate of 74.1 percent. Usable employer 
logs were collected from 949 establishments, for an adjusted response rate of 66.2 percent. A 
usable questionnaire was required in order for the employer log to be considered for use.  For 
missing information in otherwise usable surveys, the BLS employed a hot-deck procedure to 
impute a value for any item for which the establishment could not provide a response. Final 
weights were computed based on non-response adjustments and sampling weights.
39  
In addition to the establishment surveys, over 1,000 employees were surveyed. BLS field 
economists requested permission to select two employees for interviews from responding 
establishments.  The employee questionnaire was administered during the interview, as well 
collecting the past three days of training information for the training log. The log was left for the 
employee to complete over the next seven days, and then mail back to the BLS economist. The 
employee questionnaire collected demographic and employment information, as well as formal 
and informal training received while at the current employer. The training log collected detailed 
information on training and learning activities. In total, 1,074 usable questionnaires and 1,013 
usable training logs were collected from employees. Taking the 1,062 participating 
establishments s the eligible pool, the number of eligible employees was 2,214, giving a 50.6 
percent response rate for the questionnaire and 47.7 percent from the training log (Bureau of 
Labor Statistics, December 19, 2006).  Breaking these numbers down further, 470 establishments 
have two employee records, while 134 establishments have data on one employee questionnaire. 
Hence, nearly 60 percent of the 1,012 establishments include information on at least one 
randomly selected employee. 
*** 
This paper only uses the employer questionnaire for its analysis. It uses the sample 
weights to compute what percentage of firms employing 50 or more workers offer tuition 
reimbursement program, and what percentage have positive spending. However, analyses of the 
effect of tuition reimbursement programs on turnover do not use sample weights.  
                                                 
39 Final weights were computed for each establishment by computing the product of the Sampling Weight, 
Questionnaire Non-response Adjustment, and Sub-sampling factor. Similarly, the Final Weight is the product of the 
Sampling Weights, Non-response Adjustment, Sub-sampling factor, and the constant 13.143, which is the total 
number of days in the Survey’s reference period divided by 14 days (Bureau of Labor Statistics, July 10, 2006). 
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Tables and Figures 
 
Table 1: Distribution of Maximum 
Reimbursements for Tuition Programs 
Less than $1,000  6.22% 
$1,001 to $2,500  19.12% 
$2,501 to $4,000  15.67% 
$4,001 to $5,250  19.82% 
$5,251 to $7,000  4.84% 
More than $7,000  3.69% 
No Maximum  30.65% 
   
Observations  434 
 





Table 2: Sample Means  Non-Participants  Participants 
Female  66.86%  73.77% 
Age  40.8  34.6 
White  68.96%  62.60% 
Black  5.01%  10.65% 
Hispanic  7.33%  9.61% 
Asian  18.70%  17.14% 
Leave within 5 years  48.32%  33.25% 
Weekly Wage ($2001)  $1,485  $1,237 
Supervisor (Exempt)  62.88%  48.31% 
Non-Supervisor (Non-Exempt)  37.12%  51.69% 
Hired Before Sept. 1999  67.86%  62.85% 
Years in Tuition Program  -  1.96 
Tuition Spending (nominal)  -  $5,213 
Participation Rate of Peers  1.98%  2.49% 
     
Observations  8229  385 
     
Bold = Different at 5% level     
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Table 3:  Retention of Participants  (Unconditional) 










1999 or before  253  13.83%  20.95%  30.43% 
2000  74  11.84%  19.74%  32.89% 





Table 4:  Retention of Non-Participants  (Unconditional) 










1999 or before  5621  33.45%  39.35%  44.39% 
2000  1378  41.51%  51.16%  58.85% 
2001  983  41.20%  50.05%  56.97% 
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Table 5:  Probability of Separating from Employer Before 5 years 
Probit Model:   Pr(S=1)  Hired Before Sept., 1999  Hired After Sept., 1999 
  dF/dX  St. Error  dF/dX  St. Error 
Participation in CSP  -0.217  0.027**  -0.238  0.042** 
Years of Service  -0.034  0.003**  0.136  0.149 
Years of Service - Squared  0.001  0.000**  -0.274  0.143 
Female  0.010  0.015  0.007  0.021 
Age  -0.062  0.004**  -0.050  0.006** 
Age - Squared  0.001  0.000**  0.001  0.000** 
Black  0.034  0.031  -0.019  0.046 
Hispanic  -0.055  0.026*  -0.080  0.038* 
Asian  -0.087  0.018**  -0.101  0.025** 
Non-Supervisor (Not Exempt)  -0.018  0.016  -0.072  0.023** 
Weekly Wage (in thousands), 
$2001 
0.020  0.010*  -0.045  0.015** 
         
Observations  5826    2788   
Log-Likelihood  -3565.0    -1790.1   
         
* significant at 5%  ** significant at 1%       
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Table 6:  Probability of Separating from Employer Before 5 years 
Probit Model:   Pr(S=1)  Hired Before Sept., 1999  Hired After Sept., 1999 
  dF/dX  St. Error  dF/dX  St. Error 
Graduate Degree   -0.180  .036**  -0.204  .051** 
Undergraduate Degree  -0.267  0.36**  -0.307  .066** 
Years of Service  -0.034  0.000**  0.135  0.149 
Years of Service - Squared  0.001  0.000**  -0.274  0.143 
Female  0.010  0.512  0.007  0.021 
Age  -0.062  0.000**  -0.049  .006** 
Age - Squared  0.001  0.000**  0.001  .000*** 
Black  0.035  0.262  -0.015  0.046 
Hispanic  -0.054  0.040*  -0.078  .038* 
Asian  -0.087  0.000**  -0.101  .025** 
Non-Supervisor (Not Exempt)  -0.017  0.311  -0.071  .023** 
Weekly Wage (in thousands), 
$2001 
0.020  0.046*  -0.045  .015** 
         
Observations  5826    2788   
Log-Likelihood  -3563.6    -1789.4   
         
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%       
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Table 7:  Probability of Participating in CSP and 
 Separating from Employer before 5 years 
Bivariate Probit Model  Pr(CSP=1)  Pr(S=1) 
Hired Before Sept., 1999  dF/dX  St. Error  dF/dX  St. Error 
Participation in CSP      -0.0299  0.2291 
Years of Service  0.0014  0.0010  -0.0340  .0026** 
Years of Service - Squared  -0.0001  0.0000  0.0007  .0001** 
Female  0.0096  .0045*  0.0071  0.0155 
Age  -0.0002  0.0016  -0.0607  .0048** 
Age-squared  0.0000  0.0000  0.0006  .0001** 
Black  0.0273  .0120*  0.0264  0.0318 
Hispanic  0.0045  0.0079  -0.0565  .0260* 
Asian  -0.0127  .0046*  -0.0834  .0182** 
Non-Supervisor (Not Exempt)  0.0023  0.0054  -0.0209  0.0166 
Weekly Wage (in thousands), $2001  -0.0122  .0059*  0.0209  .0102* 
Participation in CSP by Peers (%)  0.0100  .0019**       
Correlation Between Errors  -0.2516  0.2668     
         
Log-Likelihood  -4488.3       
Observations  5826       
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%       
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Table 8:  Probability of Participating in CSP and  
Separating from Employer before 5 years 
Bivariate Probit Model  Pr(CSP=1)  Pr(S=1) 
Hired After Sept., 1999  dF/dX  St. Error  dF/dX  St. Error 
Participation in CSP      -0.5188  .0788** 
Years of Service   0.0667  0.0599  0.1521  0.1476 
Years of Service - Squared  -0.0279  0.0559  -0.2693  0.1419 
Female  -0.0024  0.0082  0.0061  0.0209 
Age  0.0010  0.0028  -0.0493  .0062** 
Age - Squared  0.0000  0.0000  0.0005  .0001** 
Black  0.0243  0.0201  -0.0071  0.0452 
Hispanic  -0.0062  0.0125  -0.0824  .0373* 
Asian  0.0078  0.0098  -0.0948  .0246* 
Non-Supervisor (Not Exempt)  0.0288  .0094**  -0.0585  .0239* 
Weekly Wage (in thousands), $2001  0.0121  .0056*  -0.0422  .0148* 
Participation in CSP by     Peers (%)  0.0148  .0033**       
Correlation Between Errors  0.5051  0.2379     
Log-Likelihood  -2317.2       
Observations  2788       
         
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%         47 
 
Table 9:  Probability of Pursuing an Undergraduate Degree in CSP and 
Separating from Employer before 5 years 
Bivariate Probit Model  Pr(Undergrad=1)  Pr(S=1) 
Hired Before Sept., 1999  dF/dX  St. Error  dF/dX  St. Error 
Undergraduate Degree  in CSP      -0.4197  .0285** 
Years of Service  0.0004  0.0005  -0.0335  .0026** 
Years of Service - Squared  0.0000  0.0008  0.0008  .0001** 
Female  0.0040  0.0026  0.0107  0.0152 
Age  0.0005  0.0009  -0.0609  .0044** 
Age-squared  0.0000  0.0000  0.0006  0.0001** 
Black  0.0136  0.0076  0.0433  0.0313 
Hispanic  0.0075  0.0057  -0.0480  0.0263 
Asian  -0.0010  0.0030  -0.0829  .0176** 
Non-Supervisor (Not Exempt)  0.0131  .0042**  -0.0051  0.0172 
Weekly Wage (in thousands), $2001  -0.0015  0.0031  0.0215  .0102* 
Participation in CSP by Peers (%)  0.0024  .0011*       
Correlation Between Errors  0.5522  0.3155     
         
Log-Likelihood  -4027.9       
Observations  5826       
         
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%       
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Table 10:   Probability of Pursuing an Undergraduate Degree in CSP  
and Separating from Employer before 5 years 
Bivariate Probit Model  Pr(Undergrad=1)  Pr(S=1) 
Hired After Sept., 1999  dF/dX  St. Error  dF/dX  St. Error 
Undergraduate Degree in CSP      -0.5823  .0132** 
Years of Service   0.0235  0.0249  0.1342  0.1477 
Years of Service - Squared  -0.0191  0.0238  -0.2716  0.1419 
Female  0.0035  0.0033  0.0087  0.0210 
Age  0.0002  0.0012  -0.0478  .0062** 
Age-squared  0.0000  0.0000  0.0005  .0000** 
Black  0.03239  .0157*  0.01678  0.0443 
Hispanic  0.0086  0.0080  -0.0660  0.0371 
Asian  0.0021  0.0045  -0.0971  .0243** 
Non-Supervisor (Not Exempt)  0.0190  .0061**  -0.0596  .0231** 
Weekly Wage (in thousands), $2001  0.0024  0.0036  -0.0440  .0149** 
Participation in CSP by Peers (%)  0.0029  0.0016       
Correlation Between Errors  0.8128**  0.1540     
         
Log-Likelihood  -2002.9       
Observations  2788       
         
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%         49 
 
Table 11: Probability of Pursuing an Graduate Degree in CSP and  
Separating from Employer before 5 years 
Bivariate Probit Model  Pr(Grad=1)  Pr(S=1) 
Hired Before Sept., 1999  dF/dX  St. Error  dF/dX  St. Error 
Graduate Degree in CSP      0.2198  0.1951 
Years of Service  0.0009  0.0007  -0.0339  .0026** 
Years of Service - Squared  0.0000  0.0000  0.0008  .0001** 
Female  0.0048  0.0033  0.0046  0.0152 
Age  -0.0004  0.0012  -0.0588  .0046** 
Age-squared  0.0000  0.0000  0.0006  0.0001** 
Black  0.0116  0.0084  0.0237  0.0305 
Hispanic  -0.0011  0.0052  -0.0560  .0258* 
Asian  -0.0108  .0032**  -0.0790  .0180** 
Non-Supervisor (Not Exempt)  -0.0097  .0034**  -0.0197  0.0164 
Weekly Wage (in thousands), $2001  -0.0106  .0044*  0.0219  .0102* 
Participation in CSP by Peers (%)  0.0065  .0014**       
Correlation Between Errors  -0.4449  0.2120     
         
Log-Likelihood  -4200.2       
Observations  5826       
       
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%       
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Table 12: Probability of Pursuing an Graduate Degree in CSP and  
Separating from Employer before 5 years 
Bivariate Probit Model  Pr(Grad=1)  Pr(S=1) 
Hired After Sept., 1999  dF/dX  St. Error  dF/dX  St. Error 
Graduate Degree in CSP      -0.5024  .1087** 
Years of Service  0.0402  0.0501  0.1345  0.1476 
Years of Service - Squared  -0.0101  0.0068  -0.2589  0.1422 
Female  -0.0050  0.0068  0.0043  0.0210 
Age  0.0003  0.0024  -0.0493  .0062** 
Age-squared  0.0000  0.0000  0.0005  .0001** 
Black  -0.0152  0.0094  -0.0363  0.0455 
Hispanic  -0.0161  0.0078  -0.0888  .0375* 
Asian  0.0040  0.0077  -0.0982  .0246** 
Non-Supervisor (Not Exempt)  0.0065  0.0072  -0.0734  .0232** 
Weekly Wage (in thousands), $2001  0.0085  .0043*  -0.0437  .0150** 
Participation in CSP by Peers (%)  0.0111  .0027**       
Correlation Between Errors  0.4913  0.2926     
         
Log-Likelihood  -2194.4       
Observations  2788       
         
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%         51 
 
Table 13: Means of Firm 
Characteristics 
Full Sample 
No Tuition  
Reimbursement  
Offer Tuition  
Reimbursement  
Number of Employees  668  210  926 
Average Monthly Wage*  $2,966  $2,470  $3,267 
One of Multiple Establishments (0 or 1)*  40.21%  31.33%  45.59% 
Separation Rate  11.00%  16.89%  7.68% 
Total Number of Benefits (0 to 11)  6.1  4.9  6.8 
Training Programs    
 Tuition Reimbursement Program  63.95%  -  100.00% 
Hire In-house trainers  45.13%  23.47%  57.48% 
Hire trainers from outside the firm  72.18%  50.67%  84.15% 
Occupation Composition    
Managers  10.24%  8.65%  11.13% 
Professionals  14.68%  8.14%  18.37% 
Sales  7.80%  10.32%  6.39% 
Administrative Support  13.37%  10.33%  15.08% 
Service  7.97%  12.95%  5.16% 
Production   45.90%  49.51%  43.87% 
       
Number of Firms  1057  381  676 
       
*Not available for all States (N = 838; 522 offer tuition reimbursement and 316 do not). 





Table 14:  
Tuition Programs by Industry 
(SEPT95) 
% in Sample 
% Offer Tuition  
Reimbursement  
Mining  11.64%  73.98% 
Construction  11.54%  50.00% 
Non-Durable Manufacturing  11.54%  72.13% 
Durable Manufacturing  13.25%  82.86% 
Transportation/Utilities  10.50%  62.16% 
Wholesale  10.12%  54.21% 
Retail  9.37%  26.26% 
Financial/Insurance/Real Estate  9.93%  81.90% 
Services  12.11%  63.28% 
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Table 15 :  
Probability of Offering Tuition 
Reimbursement Program 
dF/dX  St. Error  dF/dX  St. Error 
Probit Model  Pr(Tuition = 1)  Pr(Tuition = 1) 
Hire Trainer from Outside Firm (0 or 1)  0.194  0.040   
In-house Trainers on Staff (0 or 1)    0.105  0.036 
Firm Size: 100 to 500 workers  0.128  0.035  0.109  0.036 
Firm Size: 500 to 1000 workers  0.253  0.340  0.222  0.039 
Firm Size: Over 1000 workers  0.269  0.037  0.234  0.044 
Fewer than 100 workers is Excluded     
Number of Benefits (0 to 11)  0.086  0.010  0.090  0.010 
Separation rate  -0.165  0.092  -0.213  0.094 
Fraction Managers  0.726  0.239  0.750  0.238 
Fraction Professionals  0.102  0.098  0.117  0.096 
Fraction Sales  0.084  0.101  -0.020  0.105 
Fraction Administrative Support  0.231  0.123  0.228  0.123 
Fraction Service  0.084  0.101  0.034  0.100 
Fraction Production is Excluded     
Industry Controls  Included  Included 
Log Likelihood Value  -475.3  -483.8 
Observations  1057  1057 
         





 Relating Tuition 
Reimbursement and Separation 
Rates 
Coefficient  St. Error  Coefficient  St. Error 
OLS: LHS Variable  Separation Rate  Separation Rate 
Offer Tuition Reimbursement  -0.036  0.013  -0.036  0.014 
Number of Benefits (0 to 11)  -0.009  0.003  -0.007  0.003 
Ln(Average Monthly Wage)  Not Included  -0.069  0.014 
One of Multiple Establishments (0 or 1)  Not Included  0.004  0.012 
Fraction Managers  -0.115  0.066  0.003  0.072 
Fraction Professionals  -0.125  0.029  -0.087  0.033 
Fraction Sales  -0.006  0.036  0.020  0.039 
Fraction Administrative Support  0.059  0.038  0.044  0.437 
Fraction Service  0.007  0.032  0.013  0.037 
Fraction Production is Excluded     
Firm Size Controls  Included  Included 
Industry Controls  Included  Included 
Constant  0.314  0.026  0.777  0.098 
         
R-squared  0.160  0.183 
Observations  1057  838 
Bolded = Significant at 5% Level         
   53 
 
 








Percent with a BA or higher in 1990 (by State)  20.31%  20.00%  20.48% 
Percent with a BA or higher in 2000 (by State)  24.23%  23.76%  24.49% 
Percent change from 1990 to 2000 (by State)  20.01%  19.54%  20.27% 
Estimated Return to Schooling (by State)  6.07%  6.01%  6.10% 
           
Observations  1057  381  676 





Table 18:  
Probability of Offering Tuition 
Reimbursement Program 
dF/dX  St. Error  dF/dX  St. Error 
Probit Model (First Stage)  Pr(Tuition = 1)  Pr(Tuition = 1) 
Firm Size: 100 to 500 workers  0.135  0.034  0.135  0.034 
Firm Size: 500 to 1000 workers  0.246  0.034  0.247  0.034 
Firm Size: Over 1000 workers  0.273  0.035  0.274  0.035 
Fewer than 100 workers is excluded     
Number of Benefits (0 to 11)  0.095  0.010  0.095  0.010 
Fraction Managers  0.855  0.238  0.870  0.238 
Fraction Professionals  0.163  0.095  0.162  0.095 
Fraction Sales  -0.021  0.104  -0.013  0.104 
Fraction Administrative Support  0.252  0.122  0.254  0.122 
Fraction Service  0.049  0.099  0.050  0.098 
Fraction Production is excluded     
Industry Controls  Included  Included 
Instruments       
Percent with BA of Higher: 1990  0.007  0.005  0.007  0.005 
Percent Change: 1990 to 2000  0.007  0.002  0.006  0.002 
Return to Additional Year of Schooling  Not Included  0.025  0.017 
     
Log Likelihood Value  -485.7  -484.6 
Observations  1057  1057 
         
Bolded = Significant at 5% Level           54 
 
 
Table 19:  
Effect of Tuition Program on 
Separation Rates  
(Bivariate Normal MLE) 
Coefficient  St. Error  Coefficient  St. Error 
LHS Variable  Separation Rate  Pr(Tuition=1) 
Offer Tuition Reimbursement  -0.075  0.029    
Number of Benefits (0 to 11)  -0.006  0.004  0.277  0.029 
Fraction Managers  -0.095  0.067  2.517  0.692 
Fraction Professionals  -0.121  0.029  0.503  0.277 
Fraction Sales  -0.006  0.036  -0.089  0.301 
Fraction Administrative Support  0.067  0.039  0.739  0.352 
Fraction Service  0.008  0.032  0.144  0.283 
Fraction Production is Excluded     
Firm Size Controls  Included  Included 
Industry Controls  Included  Included 
Constant  0.311  0.026  -3.098  0.455 
Exclusion Restrictions          
%  BA or higher in 1990    0.019  0.015 
Change in % BA: 1990 to 2000    0.021  0.007 
Return to Schooling by State     Not Included 
Covariance between Error Terms  0.140  0.095     
St. Dev. of Separation Equation  0.167  0.004     
Log-Likelihood  -86.85   
Observations  1057   
 
Table 20:  
Effect of Tuition Program on 
Separation Rates  
(Bivariate Normal MLE) 
Coefficient  St. Error  Coefficient  St. Error 
LHS Variable  Separation Rate  Pr(Tuition=1) 
Offer Tuition Reimbursement  -0.076  0.029    
Number of Benefits (0 to 11)  -0.006  0.004  0.278  0.029 
Fraction Managers  -0.094  0.067  2.569  0.694 
Fraction Professionals  -0.121  0.029  0.503  0.277 
Fraction Sales  -0.006  0.036  -0.065  0.302 
Fraction Administrative Support  0.067  0.039  0.746  0.352 
Fraction Service  0.008  0.032  0.146  0.283 
Fraction Production is Excluded     
Firm Size Controls  Included  Included 
Industry Controls  Included  Included 
Constant  0.310  0.026  -3.537  0.535 
Exclusion Restrictions          
%  BA or higher in 1990     0.020  0.015 
Change in % BA: 1990 to 2000    0.019  0.007 
Return to Schooling by State     0.075  0.048 
Covariance between Error Terms  0.140  0.095     
St. Dev. of Separation Equation  0.167  0.004     
Log-Likelihood  -85.63   
Observations  1057   
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